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ABSTRACT
The War on Terrorism will be vastly different than any
previous U.S. military campaign. The war will span a wide
range of geographic, economic and political boundaries.
Terrorist organizations will rely on stealth and dispersion
to evade the American military and international law
enforcement agencies. The United States will therefore be
required to engage the enemy in a wide variety of arenas
and with a wide variety of tools. Thus, the War on
Terrorism will require the skillful blending of many
American and international capabilities in order to meet
the challenge. One such challenge is to cultivate and
sustain homefront morale for the War on Terrorism.
This paper will offer recommendation’s on how the
United States should address their current homefront morale
challenge through the analysis of two case studies. The
first case study will examine how Great Britain was able to
develop and sustain homefront morale during World War II.
The second case study will examine the homefront morale
issues concerning the United States involvement in the
Vietnam War, specifically on their loss of public support
for the war. Both case studies will address the
applicability of the respective information campaign to the
War on Terrorism, and will focus on generating a set of
lessons learned that can be directly applied to today’s
homefront morale challenge. Once completed, the analysis of
the two case studies will offer a solid historical basis to
develop recommendations for building homefront support for
the War on Terrorism. These recommendations will be
v
presented as answers to a set of questions, fundamental to
the homefront morale problem. The answers to these
questions, along with their rationale, will provide the
backbone of the paper’s recommendations for building and
sustaining homefront morale for the War on Terrorism.
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The 9-11 terrorist attacks aimed to directly alter
American foreign policy. By demanding the withdrawal of
U.S. troops stationed in Saudi Arabia, al-Qaeda intends to
drive US presence and influence out of the Middle East.
Secondly, al-Qaeda intends to alter the Middle East’s
balance of power by undermining American support for the
Israeli’s in their ongoing conflict with the Palestinians.
[Hayes]
Concession to these demands is unacceptable to
American national interests. The U.S. National Security
Strategy, as required by the Goldwater-Nichols Defense
Department Reorganization Act of 1986, contains three core
objectives: to enhance America’s security, to bolster
America’s economic prosperity, and to promote democracy and
human rights abroad. A concession to al-Qaeda’s demands
would violate all three of these core objectives.
A withdrawal from the region and a retraction of US
support for Israel would set a dire precedent. The message
sent around the world would be that the U.S. will bend to a
terrorist group’s demands so long as serious damage is
inflicted on America. Upon concession to al-Qaeda demands,
numerous other groups would be encouraged to act similarly
in the hopes of altering US policy. American national
security would be critically damaged.
Additionally, it is vital to the United States’
economic and political interests that it maintains
influence in the region. The Middle East represents roughly
1
64% of the world’s proven oil reserves and 34% of its gas
reserves. [Cordesman] Ensuring the availability of these
resources is essential to maintaining global economic
stability. The Middle East’s volatile political climate
demands U.S. military and diplomatic presence. The Israeli-
Palestinian conflict has the potential to escalate, and a
US withdrawal from the region would only further
destabilize the situation. Finally, the ongoing military
threat of Saddam Hussein’s regime also represents a serious
threat to the region and the world.
Concession to al-Qaeda would also undermine
democracy’s future in the Middle East. By using acts of
terrorism as propaganda, al-Qaeda could further destabilize
the political landscape within the Arab states. With the
rise of grassroot Muslim support for al-Qaeda following 9-
11, politically moderate Arab leaders have sought to
distance themselves from Western influence; thereby
weakening democracy’s standing in the region. Consequently,
Arab tolerance of Israel, the lone democratic state in the
region, has been severely undermined. The basic principles
of democracy are also threatened. As they showed in
Afghanistan, al-Qaeda is in direct opposition to
fundamental human rights, including the freedom of speech,
religion, and assembly. The United States’ objective to
promote democracy and human rights abroad would not be
served by a concession to al-Qaeda’s demands.
In light of these consequences, the United States has
made the obvious choice not to yield. The U.S. has
strengthened its commitment to prevent further attacks and
to bring the terrorists to justice. However, the United
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States is not only committed to prosecuting al-Qaeda,
rather the War on Terrorism aims to remove terrorism as a
means of achieving political aims.
The War on Terrorism will be vastly different than any
previous U.S. military campaign. The war will span a wide
range of geographic, economic and political boundaries.
Terrorist organizations will rely on stealth and dispersion
to evade the American military and international law
enforcement agencies. The United States will therefore be
required to engage the enemy in a wide variety of arenas
and with a wide variety of tools. Thus, the War on
Terrorism will require the skillful blending of many
American and international capabilities in order to meet
the challenge. One such challenge is to cultivate and
sustain homefront morale for the War on Terrorism.
B. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HOMEFRONT MORALE
Persuasion is the ultimate purpose of every terrorist
action and relies on both the rallying of ones own morale
combined with the degradation of the opposition’s morale.
Terrorism hopes to provide "propaganda by deed," whereby a
terrorist act seeks to “awaken the consciousness of the
people” to their cause. [Laqueur] By inducing a western
escalation of the conflict, al-Qaeda hopes to provide the
catalyst for an Arab revolution in opposition to the West.
The coalition of Arab states would constitute a force
capable of threatening the prosperity of western
civilization, and therefore capable of forcing the
withdrawal of western presence in the Middle East.
Terrorism also seeks to undermine homefront support of
American foreign policy. Al-Qaeda hopes to meet their
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political aims by having a dramatic effect on the American
will to fight. By inflicting, or threatening to inflict
significant damage to the United States and its populace,
al-Qaeda hopes to force the American public into opposition
of the governments Middle East policy. [Tugwell, pg. 68] By
developing and maintaining homefront morale the American
government would deny the terrorists the effect their
attacks intend.
Further, The War on Terrorism will undoubtedly be a
protracted campaign, requiring a great deal of budgetary
investment. In order to assure continued monetary support
for the war effort, the public must believe that victory is
possible. Public support for the war will lead to political
support for the war, which in turn will lead to budgetary
support. Armed with the necessary funds and political
mandate, the government will be empowered to take the
necessary measures to prevent further attacks and
effectively prosecute the terrorist networks.
Maurice Tugwell, author of Terrorism as a
Psychological Strategy, claims that a military campaign can
only exist if the warring nation meets three psychological
criteria. The three convictions, termed the Mobilizing
Trinity, consist of the following:
First, a belief in something good to be promoted
or defended;
Second, a belief in something evil to be
destroyed or resisted;
Third, a belief in the ultimate victory of the
good cause. [Tugwell, pg. 70]
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While it cannot do so alone, a homefront morale
campaign can aid in meeting the criteria by serving as the
intermediary between the public and the cause. The
development and implementation of a campaign for homefront
morale can help form the public’s perception of what is at
stake, who the enemy is, and the prospect of victory. The
question thus becomes how should the U.S. government
develop, maintain, and regulate public support for the war?
C. METHODOLOGY
This paper answers the above question through the
analysis of two case studies. The first case study will
examine how Great Britain was able to develop and sustain
homefront morale during World War II. The second case study
will examine the homefront morale issues concerning the
United States involvement in the Vietnam War, specifically
on their loss of public support for the war. Both case
studies will address the applicability of the respective
campaign to the War on Terrorism, and will focus on
generating a set of lessons learned that can be directly
applied to today’s homefront morale challenge. Once
completed, the analysis of the two case studies will offer
a solid historical basis to develop recommendations for
building homefront support for the War on Terrorism. These
recommendations will be presented as answers to the
following four questions: who should disseminate war
information, how should homefront morale be gauged, what
role should the media play, fundamental themes should be
promoted? The answers to these questions, along with their
rationale, will provide the backbone of the paper’s
recommendations for building and sustaining homefront
morale for the War on Terrorism.
5
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
6
II. WORLD WAR II CASE STUDY
A. INTRODUCTION
The first case study examines Great Britain’s campaign
to develop and sustain homefront morale during World War
II. The analysis presents a set of lessons learned that can
be directly applied to the development and maintenance of
homefront morale for the War on Terrorism. Why Britain was
forced to deal with the homefront morale issue and the
nation’s subsequent organization and strategy is also
discussed.
The examination of the British homefront morale
campaign during World War II is relevant for a host of
reasons. The British faced an adversary, much like America
faces in the War on Terrorism, which sought to degrade
their power and influence. The British nation and civilian
population were physically under attack, much like America
and Americans are today. Clearly many differences also
exist between the American War on Terrorism and the British
role in World War II. For instance, the British faced a
regional hegemony, whereas the United States faces a
coalition of non-state powers. However, care was taken to
find the common campaign attributes and subsequently
generate lessons learned that can be applied to today’s
homefront morale challenge.
B. THE HOMEFRONT MORALE PROBLEM
Prior to World War II the British government came to
recognize the important role homefront morale would play in
the coming war with Germany. The need for homefront morale
arose out of the changing nature of modern warfare:
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“warfare has come to resemble campaigns in which whole
countries besiege one another.” [Speier, pg. 5] Within this
modern warfare framework, the industrial and organizational
skills of the home populace directly impact the
effectiveness of a nation’s armed forces. Accordingly,
defeat may not flow from a collapse of armies on a
conventional battlefield but from the weakening of
industrial assets at home. The breakdown of homefront
morale could therefore directly impinge the effectiveness
of the British Armed Forces through a decline in industrial
output. The citizen’s morale and his willingness to
contribute to the war effort had therefore become of
decisive military importance. [McLaine, pg. 2]
While maintaining a productive workforce was the
primary aim, there were other reasons for developing a
homefront morale campaign. In the 1930’s, the Nazi’s began
to use propaganda in an attempt to degrade and destroy
rival governments. The organization of legions of Germans
and foreign nationals into a worldwide fifth column
provided the Nazi’s a means of distributing propaganda
throughout the world. The Nazi’s hoped to use fifth
column’s propaganda to disable nations prior to attack or
annexation. [Laurie, pg. 8] The reported use of a Nazi
fifth column to “spread the spirit of defeatism” throughout
the European continent aroused fear within the British
government. [McLaine, pg. 75] The homefront morale
campaign, therefore, set out to counter the Nazi’s
subversive scheme to degrade British governmental power.
The British morale building campaign had to account
for changes in the social and political environment since
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World War I. For instance, the populace’s “increasing
disinclination” to accept the policies and decisions of
government complicated the morale building environment.
Further, the advent of German long range bombers meant that
the British populace became a viable target. [McLaine, pg.
2] While World War I had been fought on the distant
battlefield, the British government had to prepare their
nation for a war fought in their own backyard. Thus, the
homefront morale campaign would have to psychologically
prepare the homefront for the rigors and horrors of total
war.
Finally, the homefront morale campaign aimed to
counter the communist threat. While the British recognized
that the Nazi’s could not use communism against them, they
did fear adoption of communism’s pacifist outlook,
particularly among the working class. [McLaine, pg. 59]
Thus, the government set out to squelch communism’s impact
on homefront morale. Ultimately, the British government
used propaganda in order to walk the fine line between
militarily supporting the Russians on the Eastern Front,
and morally discarding communist ideology.
C. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE HOMEFRONT MORALE CAMPAIGN
Throughout the early 1930’s the British government
examined the homefront morale problem, ultimately creating
the Ministry of Information in 1935 to organize and execute
the campaign. Due to the dramatic differences between the
two eras and a lack of historical documentation, the
organization and doctrine of the Ministry of Information
had very little in common British propaganda during World
War I. [McLaine, pg. 12] Though it was not admitted, the
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Ministry closely resembled the organization of Joseph
Goebbels Ministry of Propaganda. [McLaine, pg. 12]
The Ministry contained an intelligence element, known
as the Collecting Division, which was tasked with
collecting information pertaining to the population’s state
of morale: “The [Collecting] Division’s immediate tasks
were to supply the Ministry itself with routine monthly and
ad hoc reports on matters of urgency and on the
effectiveness of the propaganda.” [McLaine, pg. 51] The
Collecting Division developed a network of information
sources, including social clubs, the press, and public
opinion polls. The polling organizations, Mass-Observation
and British Institute for Public Opinion, utilized the same
tools as the Gallup Poll in the United States.
The Ministry also contained a News division which
officially aspired “to tell the truth, nothing but the
truth, and as near as possible the whole truth.” [McLaine,
pg. 26] The Ministry demanded that its News Division should
be privy to all available service information, arguing that
full access would allow for more polished propaganda.
Further, they argued that full access would allow them to
more effectively carry out their censorship
responsibilities. In the end, the War Services never fully
trusted the News Division, resulting in significant
information flow problems.
In terms of censorship, the Ministry of Information
struggled to balance the public’s desire for information,
the media’s need for autonomy, and the military’s need to
maintain operational secrecy. While the Ministry of
Information understood the public voracious desire for war
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information, they also recognized that the dissemination of
false or overly optimistic news by an independent press
would foster anxiety and rumor, and could ultimately create
distrust for the government’s motives and conduct of the
war. [McLaine, pg. 36] The government, and therefore the
Ministry, decided that censorship was the solution. The
backbone of the Ministry of Information’s censorship policy
was Defense Regulation 3, which made it a criminal offense
to obtain, record, communicate or publish any information
which might be of military value to the enemy. [McLaine,
pg. 24] While censorship of the press was officially
voluntary, editors were to submit articles with potentially
sensitive information to the Ministry’s News Division for
review. Thus, the Ministry inherently made any questionable
news report subject to censorship.
Throughout the war, the Ministry of Information tried
to frame themselves as the liaison between the people and
the government. In no way did the Ministry want to be
associated with propaganda: “It should not, of course, be
hinted that [The Ministry of Information] knows the
existence of such a thing as public morale.” [McLaine, pg.
49] The Ministry attempted to seamlessly provide the public
with complete and trustworthy news that also furthered its
homefront morale agenda.
The Ministry of Information’s effectiveness at
cultivating homefront morale is uncertain. The British
government never concluded that homefront morale was
dangerously low. In fact, history has shown British
homefront morale as being exceptionally high. As Winston
Churchill said at the conclusion of the war, “The British
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people have shown a very high degree of common sense.”
[McLaine, pg. 277] However, to attribute the high state of
civilian morale solely on the Ministry of Information would
be naïve. Instead of trying to quantify the effect the
Ministry had on homefront morale, this paper examines the
Ministry of Information’s campaign by analyzing the logic
and rationale behind its organization and initiatives.
D. RELEVANT LESSONS LEARNED
1. Information Availability
Throughout World War II, the Ministry of Information
struggled to provide relevant and thorough news to the
British people. However, the organizational design of the
British government severely hampered the Ministry’s ability
to do so. An obvious example of this problem occurred in
the beginning of the war, as Germany began their attack on
Poland. Though England was obligated by treaty to defend
Poland and had gone to war ostensibly to defend Poland, the
British government seemed resigned to watch as the nation
fell to Nazi forces. [McLaine, pg. 34] The public thirsted
for any information regarding the war, specifically an
articulation of war aims. Yet, the Ministry of Information
released nothing but innocuous information to the public.
When Poland finally fell to German forces, the Government
appeared to be apathetic. [McLaine, pg. 35]
The public’s unmet need for information had a negative
effect on homefront morale. Some citizens began to doubt
the very existence of war, while others subsidized the lack
of information by creating and distributing rumors.
[McLaine, pg. 34] The problem cut to the heart of
government’s strength and viability, and raised questions
of the Ministry of Information’s credibility.
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Members of Government called for the Ministry of
Information to show Great Britain:
fighting Germany on land, in the air, and at sea,
ceaselessly, without remorse, with all her armed
might, with financial resources, industrial
manpower, and commercial assets, with all her
idealism and determination. [McLaine, pg. 45]
However, the interaction between the ministry and the
war services prevented such a message from being presented.
The Ministry of Information did not have full access to war
information; rather information was pre-selected by the war
services prior to reaching the Ministry. The military had a
fundamental distrust of the Ministry of Information, and
therefore failed to share sensitive information in order to
maintain operational security. As Winston Churchill said:
it was for the Admiralty or other department to
purvey to the Ministry the raw meat and
vegetables and for the Ministry to cook and serve
the dish to the public. If the Admiralty could
have had it their way they would prefer a policy
of complete silence. [McLaine, pg. 36]
Due to the powerful political influence of the War
Services and the lack of political clout of the Ministry,
this information flow problem was never fully corrected.
The Ministry of Information could have been more effective
if they had been privy to all war information.
2. Gauging Morale
The Ministry of Information struggled to develop and
implement an effective means of gauging the morale of the
people. From the onset, the British government stated that
the only viable means of gauging morale was to analyze
actions, not thoughts. Dr. Stephen Taylor, Head of the Home
Intelligence Division, stated that “morale must… be
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ultimately measured not by what one thinks or says, but by
what he does and how he does it.” [McLaine, pg. 119] While
in theory the Ministry was to limit their research of
public morale to actions, in practice they were also deeply
concerned with public opinion. The inclusion of thoughts
complicated the Collecting Division’s job, and made
judgments on the state of homefront morale much more
imprecise.
The Ministry of Information also at times
misinterpreted certain behaviors as being indicative of
lowered homefront morale. Worrisome behaviors were
primarily hysteria, trekking,1 and looting. While hysteria
and looting were rarely observed, trekking was widespread.
[McLaine, pg. 115] Trekking was interpreted by the Ministry
as an indication of the population’s hopelessness.
[McLaine, pg. 111] An internal ministry analysis stated the
following:
It is known there is a section of the population…
who are of a weaker constitutional make-up than
the rest. These people react to different
situations in two ways – either by cowardly
retreat or by a neurotic mental breakdown… the
potentially neurotic section of the population
takes to the roads each evening and seeks safety
in dispersal. [Home Intelligence Weekly Report,
23-30 April 1941]
Within the same report, the Home Intelligence Division
acknowledged that the majority of the people returned to
the cities and their jobs each morning. If morale were to
be solely judged by actions that promote or hinder the
cause, trekking would never have raised any concerns. The
1 Trekking was the term applied to the exodus of people from the
cities during air raids.
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Ministry confused the desire to live with hopelessness. The
lack of a universally accepted definition of homefront
morale clouded the Ministry’s ability to gauge the state of
public opinion and behavior. The above example illustrates
the need for a rational definition of both homefront morale
and the actions or thoughts that indicate lowered morale.
3. Human Factors
The Ministry of Information did not fully appreciate
the dynamic nature of morale. An example of this
shortcoming occurred from September 1939 to May 1940, as
Britain prepared to face a German bombing campaign. Coupled
with the nation’s physical preparation for bombardment, the
Ministry of Information began to distribute propaganda to
bolster homefront morale. [Your Courage, Your Cheerfulness,
Your Resolution Poster, McLaine, pg. 87] However, the
threat was late in materializing, and the propaganda
campaign proved unnecessary, if not counter-productive. As
The Times reported:
…the insipid and patronizing invocations to which
the passer-by is now being treated have a power
of exasperation which is all their own. There may
be no intrinsic harm in their faint, academic
piety, but the implication that the public morale
needs this kind of support, or, if it did, that
this is the kind of support it would need, is
calculated to provoke a response which is neither
academic nor pious. [Briggs, pg. 164-5]
While impossible to ascertain how many people shared
this opinion, the prominent nature of the statement shows
that the opinion did exist. Clearly, the Ministry failed to
realize that their efforts had to be coupled with a need,
lest they desired to annoy their audience.
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The unmaterialized German threat coupled with the
enormous anticipation also lead to concerns over the
longevity of the British people’s morale. At the time, Home
Secretary Sir John Anderson presented a stern warning
regarding the state of British morale:
Criticism of the blackout, the strength of the
Civil Defense personnel, the emergency hospital
scheme, all reflect the same tendency to call in
question the need for the precautions which have
been taken; and in the present state of public
opinion there is a real danger that the re-
adjustments that have been made to meet present
circumstances may be interpreted as an admission
that the scale of our Civil Defense measures was
set out of proportion to any risks of large scale
air attack, merely because no such attack has yet
to be delivered; and unless active steps are
taken to counter this spirit of false optimism we
may well find that, by the time that the blow
falls, we shall have dissipated the resources and
broken the morale which we have built up to
resist it. 4 [McLaine, pg. 35]
As the statement reflects, the enormous build-up
threatened to give the people a false sense of security.
The Ministry initially failed to recognize that the British
people could not be held in a constant state of
preparedness, instead their efforts and thoughts had to be
regulated.
A morale building campaign cannot count on a static
level of homefront morale; rather a cyclical nature of ebbs
and flows should be expected. [Rokeach, pg. 139] Rather
than heightening the public’s anticipation, the Ministry
could have been more effective if they had set out to
temper the people’s nervousness and false expectations.
Ultimately, the Ministry came to understand the need to
16
match their morale-building efforts with the situation.
[McLaine, pg. 58]
4. The Value of Bad News
The Ministry of Information understood that bad news
could be leveraged in favor of homefront morale. While
clearly too much bad news may cultivate the feeling of
hopelessness, the Ministry recognized that by occasionally
informing the public of bad news their credibility was
strengthened. [Pratkanis, pg. 133] Tom Clarke, then Deputy
Director of the Ministry’s News Division, expressed the
Ministry’s viewpoint on the value of bad news:
Frankness will give all the more emphasis to
bulletins announcing our successes. Our civilian
population is not afraid of an occasional dose of
bad news, and would not be cast in panic by it …
Detail kills the public distrust of vague
announcements. [McLaine, pg. 64]
As the quote indicates, bad news could be used to
establish the Ministry’s credibility and also to emphasize
British successes. The ministry correctly understood that
bad news could be leveraged to yield greater homefront
morale.
5. Audience Assessment
Lessons can also be derived from the Ministry of
Information’s estimation of the British people’s
intelligence, biases, and needs.
The Ministry of Information often failed to understand
their audience’s point of view. This failure is highlighted
in two posters developed by the Ministry. The first poster
published by the Ministry in 1939 involved the depiction of
a Long Bowman from the Hundred Years War. While the poster
was intended to convey British resilience, its
17
interpretation by some British people was far different.
The poster evoked questions of class responsibility,
hinting that the lower class would be primarily responsible
for the defense of Great Britain. [McLaine, pg. 22] While
the Ministry of Information strived to unite Britain, the
poster proved to be counter productive to the cause.
Clearly, care should be taken to determine all possible
interpretations of propaganda.
The second poorly designed poster, titled Mightier
Yet, was released during the heaviest period of German
bombing. [Mightier Yet Poster, McLaine, pg. 79] The poster
was intended to reassure the public that the British armed
forces were strong and capable. The theme failed to meet
the people’s psychological needs, many of whom were seeking
shelter from German bombardment. The British people
required propaganda relating to their own situation and
efforts, not a vague reassuring of British strength.
[McLaine, pg. 99] The example illustrates the importance of
a flexible morale building campaign that matches propaganda
with the psychological needs of the audience.
Another example of the British Ministry of Defense
failure to recognize the needs of the people was their
distribution of the pamphlet titled If the Invader Comes.
The pamphlet set forth rough guidelines for how citizens
should react if the Germans invaded Britain. Urging people
to “Stay Put” and attempt to prevent the enemy’s access to
petrol and transportation, the document was widely faulted
for providing only vague instructions. [McLaine, pg. 227]
Instead of satisfying the public’s need for “words of
command,” the Ministry supplied the public with ”words of
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suggestion.” [McLaine, pg. 70] As the head of the Ministry
would noted:
The public is tired of being left to fend for
itself ways of helping in the war effort. People
want to be ordered about, to have sacrifices
imposed on them, to be provided with occupations
obviously related to national defense… unless the
demand for compulsion is met, the public will
feel the government lacks efficiency and energy…
[McLaine, pg. 71]
Clearly, the British government could not afford to be
seen as lacking decisiveness, and would subsequently
produce more specific instructions. The Ministry of
Information should have taken greater care in assessing
their audience’s point of view.
6. Framing the Enemy
Lessons can also be gleaned from the Ministry of
Information’s portrayal of the German character.
Officially, the Ministry claimed to rely solely on the
truth in their portrayal of Germany. However, as George
Orwell said, “All propaganda is lies, even when one is
telling the truth.” [McLaine, pg. 137] The Ministry fully
and truthfully portrayed the Germans only when it met their
aims. The Ministry of Information’s attempts to mold the
public perception of the enemy did face certain challenges.
Prior to 1940, many British citizens believed, due to
Germany’s seemingly effortless charge across Europe, that
Germany and Hitler were unbeatable. [McLaine, pg. 146] The
implied hopelessness of such a belief directly opposed the
homefront morale campaign. The Ministry, therefore, set out
to dispel the notion. The following summarizes the Ministry
19
of Information’s approach to destroying Hitler’s mythic
stature:
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that
Hitler’s success is engendering a legend
infallibility which is immensely powerful… THIS
LEGEND MUST BE DEFEATED. It must be made clear
that the little countries Hitler has invaded were
lying defenseless at Hitler’s door for
generations. Even in France he is only making
headway by shear weight of steel. Hitler is
personally fallible, despicable, cowardly… He is
important only as the embodiment of the German
lust for power in the most evil guise it has ever
taken. [McLaine, pg. 146]
As the quote indicates, the Ministry aimed to degrade
Hitler’s achievements and to stress the strategic
differences between the British and the rest of Europe.
Further, Hitler was not portrayed as a unique figure in
history. Rather, the Ministry desired to equate Hitler
previous European aggressors, such as Bismarck and
Napoleon. This association, while slight, was designed to
reassure the British people that Hitler, like his
historical predecessors, could be defeated. [McLaine, pg.
145]
The quote also indicates that the Ministry sought to
associate the German character with evil. As Hans Speier
stated in his book Morale and Propaganda: “In modern war,
in which mass opinions count, the enemy has to be wholly
identified… with the principle of evil, so that one can
mobilize the necessary power of right for ones own cause.”
[Speier, pg. 137] While the Ministry of Information sought
to portray Germany as fundamentally evil, they recognized
the strategic value of regulating the British public’s
exposure to that evil.
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The Ministry of Information came to realize the value
of rationing the publication or broadcast of German
atrocities. While the Ministry understood that the
communication of German atrocities would strengthen the
notion of Germany’s evil nature, they also recognized that
too much coverage would be counter-productive. Excessive
coverage of German atrocities could have created apathy
among their audience, and would prevent the particularly
heinous transgressions from being viewed in their proper
light. [McLaine, pg. 165] A Ministry of Information’s
Planning Committee outlined the ministry’s strategy with
regards to German atrocities:
In self defense people prefer to think that the
victims were specially marked men – and probably
a pretty bad lot anyway. A certain amount of
horror is needed but it must be used sparingly
and must deal always with treatment of
indisputably innocent people. [McLaine, pg. 166]
The Ministry sought to keep their war coverage from
becoming simple horror stories. Instead, the ministry
sought to evoke real empathy among their audience for the
victims, and therefore cultivate the British people’s
hatred for Germany. [McLaine, pg. 166] Further, the British
people’s information needs proved to be factual, and less
narrative. Harold Nicholson, head of Ministry’s propaganda
development, stated:
From the propaganda point of view all the country
really wants is some assurance of how victory is
to be achieved. They are bored by talks of
righteousness of our cause and our eventual
triumph. What they really want are facts
regarding how we are going to beat the Germans. I
have no idea how we are going to give them those
facts. [McLaine, pg. 227]
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Thus, the audience was not necessarily interested in
the evil nature of Germany, and excessive focus on the
issue threatened to cause the Ministry audience to discount
their message. Care had to be taken to ensure that the
communication of German atrocities was measured.
An illuminating example of the Ministry’s strategy was
their coverage of the Nazi concentration camps. Though the
British government undoubtedly knew about the genocide,
they did not report on the subject prior to 1944. [McLaine,
pg. 167] Why did the British choose not to use the
atrocities in anti-German propaganda?
The Ministry did not feel that the atmosphere was
right for disclosure. The state of British opinion on the
German race indicated that the Ministry had effectively
cultivated a climate of hatred toward the German race. A
poll conducted in April 1943 showed that 41% of the British
citizenry believed the German people, as distinct from the
Nazi government, were responsible for the war. [McLaine,
pg. 169] Thus, there was no need to meddle in the public
perception of Germany and Germans.
According to Home Intelligence, many British citizens
held anti-Semitic beliefs:
The Growth of anti-Semitism is reported from
widely separated areas. Infringements of the
rationing orders, dealings in the black markets,
and deliberate cunning evasions of measures
instituted by the Government to meet war time
conditions are said to have aroused strong public
feeling. [McLaine pg. 167]
The unpredictable public reaction to the German
persecution of the Jew’s was a risk the Ministry of
Information was not willing to take. The example shows the
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Ministry of Information’s adherence to their strategy of
rationed disclosure of German atrocities. The Ministry
effectively weighed the cost of disclosure against the
benefit of disclosure, and took action accordingly.
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The second case study examines American homefront
morale during the Vietnam War (1965-1974).2 The purpose of
this case study is three-fold: to discuss the American
homefront information strategy, to examine the role that
homefront morale played in the Vietnam War, and to present
a set of lessons learned that can be applied to the War on
Terrorism’s homefront morale effort. It is essential to
begin with an examination of the applicability of Vietnam
to the War on Terrorism.
A study of American homefront morale during the
Vietnam War is germane to the War on Terrorism. History has
credited the lack of public support for the war as a
fundamental cause of the United State’s withdrawal from
Vietnam. Today’s military planners, to avoid a similar
fate, should be aware of why and how the public turned
against the war. Secondly, the political and social
atmosphere throughout the Vietnam War is more similar to
today’s environment than World War II. An analysis of
Vietnam offers greater insight into how today’s public will
react to both the rigors of war and various information
strategies. Thirdly, the Vietnam War was a protracted,
limited campaign. While difficult to predict the future, it
appears that the War on Terrorism will be a protracted
campaign, marked by limited engagements in geographically
dispersed regions. Finally, both conflicts aimed to prevent
2 The case study’s scope of analysis is limited by the following two
events: President Lyndon Johnson’s escalation of American military
forces from 74,000 to 174,000 (July, 1965), and the conclusion of the
Paris Peace Talks (January, 1974).
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further escalation. Vietnam was intended to thwart the
spread of communism in Indochina, and therefore prevent
World War III. [Hallin, pg. 60] Similarly, military action
in the War on Terrorism is intended to protect the United
States from future acts of terrorism. The War on Terrorism,
like Vietnam, will have to sell the public on proactive
engagement of the enemy.
The comparison of the War on Terrorism to Vietnam does
have limits. For instance, the conflict in Vietnam was
against an identifiable nation state, whereas the War on
Terrorism is against a political strategy. In Vietnam, the
United States’ primary military objective was to force a
North Vietnamese surrender. The War on Terrorism would not
end with an al-Qaeda surrender; instead the United States
seeks to remove Terrorism as an acceptable means of
political bargaining. Secondly, Vietnam was a regional
conflict, whereas the War on Terrorism is a global
conflict. The fall of Saigon in 1975 and the ultimate fall
of the Soviet Union proved American national security was
not at stake with the loss of South Vietnam to communism.
The loss of Vietnam to communism did not threaten the
United States’ economic viability, or the security of the
American citizenry. Instead, the conflict in Vietnam
pursued the national objective of promoting democracy
throughout the world. As demonstrated in chapter one, the
National Security of the United States is at stake in the
War on Terrorism. Finally, whereas the fighting in Vietnam
was explicitly accessible to the American public, much of
the War on Terrorism will be fought in secret.
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B. HOMEFRONT MORALE AND THE VIETNAM WAR
Throughout the Vietnam War, the American government
understood that controlling homefront morale was central to
their war effort. In order to force surrender, the North
Vietnamese had to believe that the United States was fully
committed to winning the war. The credibility of America’s
commitment was directly dependent on the American public’s
support for the war effort.
Secondly, while they were forced to control public
opinion in order to sustain support for American
engagement, the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations also
sought to control the scale of American presence.3 Both
Administrations feared that if the hawks were to become too
vocal, the war could grow politically and militarily out of
control. By keeping the war limited, both Administrations
attempted to keep the war off the political agenda. [Lind,
pg. 82]
President Kennedy, hoping for re-election in 1964,
chose to fight a limited war because he felt the political
opposition gave him no other choice. President Johnson, on
the other hand, chose to fight a limited war because he was
unwilling to sacrifice other political priorities for an
all-out war effort. Further, Johnson was not convinced that
the expanded measures advocated by the military would bring
victory at a reasonable cost, and was concerned that the
budgetary expenditure would require drastic cuts in
domestic spending. [Hallin, pg. 212] Johnson was not
willing to sacrifice his “Great Society” initiative for a
3 The Nixon Administration, for the most part, inherited the war in
Vietnam. Prior to taking office, the war in Vietnam had become a major
political issue. While pursuing “Peace with Honor,” Nixon could not
possibly remove Vietnam from the political agenda.
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total war in Vietnam. [Hallin, pg. 61] To both the Kennedy
and Johnson Administrations, controlling homefront morale
was central to not only fighting the war in Vietnam, but
fighting on acceptable terms.
1. Selling the War to the American Public
Justifying significant military action in Vietnam to
the American people proved to be a difficult task.
Americans would be killed on behalf of a small unknown
nation, with limited economic and political ties to the
United States. France had already withdrawn from the
effort, and the threat of losing Vietnam to communism did
not instinctively invoke fear in the American psyche.
Regardless, the government would pursue a war in Vietnam
and would sell the war around two messages.4
Fundamental to justifying the war in Vietnam was the
strategy of containment and its symbolic roots in the
“lessons of history.” [Hallin, pg. 61] By proactively
engaging the spread of communism, the United States would
prevent other, potentially larger conflicts. [Hallin, 61]
Thus, the government sought to educate the public on the
strategic necessity of the containment of communism in
Indochina. As President Johnson said, following the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution: “I am convinced that our retreat from
this challenge would open the path to World War III.”
[Sobel, pg. 65] Losing South Vietnam to the communists,
according to the government, would threaten the security of
4 (July 17, 1965) President Johnson’s approval of the deployment of
100,000 additional troops to join the 74,000 troops already committed
marked the unofficial beginning of the American war in Vietnam. U.S.
forces would no longer be used to guard installations and to provide
emergency backup to South Vietnamese, but would assume the burden of
defeating the NLF and the North Vietnamese. America committed itself to
a land war in Asia. [Hallin, pg. 61] The Johnson Administration’s
justification of war in Vietnam would act as the framework for the
entire war.
28
the United States and the free world. Thus, public support
for the war in Vietnam was to be derived out of the
American fear of communism.
The government also sought to associate the thwarting
of communist aggression in Vietnam with past American
military campaigns. President Johnson’s statement on July
28, 1965, following the announcement of the troop
deployment, shows how history was used to justify military
action in Vietnam:
Nor would surrender in Vietnam bring peace,
because we learned from Hitler at Munich that
success only feeds the appetite of aggression.
The battle would be renewed in one country and
then another country, bringing with it perhaps
even larger and crueler conflict, as we have
learned from the lessons of history. [Hallin, pg.
60]
The linking of Vietnam to history served two purposes.
Through historical analogy, the government would derive
support for containment by simplifying what was at stake
and what had to be done. For instance, by relating the
spread of communism to Hitler’s land grab, the government
hoped to translate the public’s opposition to Hitler into a
consensus against the spread of communism. Secondly, by
tying Vietnam to history the government hoped to challenge
the current generation of Americans. Whereas previous
generations had fought in World War II and Korea, the
current generation’s place in the American military
tradition would be tested in Vietnam. By making it a
generational objective, the government hoped to rally the
most influential section of the population behind the
cause.
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2. Tet and the Fracturing of Homefront Morale
The Tet Offensive in January 1968 marked the turning
point in homefront morale during the Vietnam War. Before
the offensive, a clear majority of Americans approved of
the war and the government’s handling of the conflict.5
[Hallin, pg. 9] However, many Americans interpreted Tet as
an indication that the war would not be won easily or
quickly. Clark Clifford, the Secretary of Defense under
President Johnson, would later note: “Here [the American
public] thought things were going well, and thought maybe
we were near the end of it, and here the enemy proved to be
infinitely stronger….That really tipped over the bucket
with the American people.” [Sobel, pg. 76] From November
1967 to February 1968, the number of people who thought the
United States was making progress in the war dropped from
51% to 32%. President’s Johnson’s approval rating, over
the same period, was cut by 13 points. [Lind, pg. 137]
While public support for Vietnam was clearly damaged by the
Tet Offensive, it was only the start of the decline in
homefront morale. A clear dichotomy in public opinion would
take form. While the conservative South remained behind the
5 Gallop Poll data on the number of People believing “American
involvement in Vietnam was a mistake”: 1965: 25%, 1967: 46%, 1968: 55%
[Lind, pg. 137].
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war effort, moderates increasingly joined the liberal left
in opposition to the war. [Lind, pg. 272]
3. Tet and the Changing News Coverage
The Media’s coverage of the war in Vietnam began to
turn against the government following the Tet Offensive in
1968. Daniel Hallin, in his book The Uncensored War,
identified five general themes promoted by journalists
covering the war prior to the Tet Offensive. By examining
these themes before and after the Tet, the changing voice
of war coverage is clearly seen.6
One theme promoted by the media was that “war is a
national endeavor.” American journalists had, for the most
part, described the American presence in Vietnam in the
first person. The war, like World War II or Korea, was
termed “our” war. [Hallin, pg. 142] According to Hallin,
the media willingly split the Vietnam conflict into two
groups: “us” and “them.” By associating their work with the
war, the news media accepted a role in the American war
effort. [Hallin, pg. 142]
Following Tet, the media no longer referred to Vietnam
as “our war,” rather it became referred to as “the” war.
According to Hallin, journalists began to distance
themselves and their profession from the American war
effort in Vietnam. [Hallin, pg. 175] Reflecting the growing
skepticism of the war, the media no longer assumed a
supporting role to the American mission. Instead, the media
began to openly challenge the government’s policies and the
militaries conduct.
6 Daniel Hallin’s five themes were derived by a statistical examination of a
wide range of news sources, including both newspapers and television. Further,
the study covered the entire American presence in Vietnam.
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Prior to Tet, the media also promoted the notion that
“war is an American tradition.” [Hallin, pg. 142] The
media, like the government, sought to equate Vietnam to
past American military campaigns, particularly World War
II. An illustrative example of this association came from
NBC’s Dean Brelis on July 4, 1966. Brelis closed his
broadcast by saying “the first infantry Division, the Big
Red 1 of North Africa, Omaha Beach, Normandy, Germany, and
now the Cambodian border.” [Hallin, pg. 142] Like the
government, the media used metaphors to make unfamiliar
events understandable. The overall effect of this was to
take Vietnam out of the present context, placing it within
the American military tradition. [Hallin, pg. 143]
Following Tet, Hallin found no references to World War
II. It would appear that “Vietnam was now cut off from that
legitimizing connection with tradition.” [Hallin, pg. 175]
As previously noted, the United States could not decisively
win the war in Vietnam without a major re-escalation; yet
significant escalation was simply not an option to
President Johnson. According to Hallin, the World War II-
Vietnam analogy became irrelevant and inappropriate.
[Hallin, pg. 175]
Thirdly, the media promoted the notion that “war is
manly.” [Hallin, pg. 175] The theme was directly related to
the American understanding of war during the 1950’s and
1960s. Hallin identified two elements that were especially
important to the American conception of “being a man”:
toughness and professionalism. War was considered manly
because it gave a man the opportunity to prove his
toughness, to determine if he could pass the test of war.
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An example of this theme is found in a report from NBC’s
Garrick Utley: “They are Marines. They are good, and they
know it. But every battle, every landing, is a new test of
what a man and what a unit can do.” [Hallin, pg. 144] War
also gave American men the chance to show mastery and
control of their work, to show that they were
professionals. Because he was a professional, the American
soldier not only did his job well but was free of
vindictiveness. Thus, the media found little cause to
report on civilian casualties, for the American soldier was
doing everything in his power to prevent them. [Hallin, pg.
144] All in all, by portraying the soldier as a heroic
figure, the media effectively strengthened the public’s
trust of the American military.
The heroic stature of the American soldier became
clouded following the Tet Offensive.7 According to Hallin,
the change is most clearly demonstrated by media’s handling
casualties. As the war effort stagnated, the media
naturally began to focus on the human costs of the war. The
weekly “Body Count,” announced every Thursday, became a
prominent event. [Hallin, pg. 176] The media, in this case
ABC’s David Brinkley, tried to condone the coldness of the
statistic:
Today in Saigon they announced the casualty
figures for the week, and though they came out in
7 There were negative stories prior to the Tet Offensive. The most
famous example being Morley Safer’s (CBS) August 1965 report showing
American Marines burning the village of Cam Ne. Though the Americans
were telling, in English, the Vietnamese to exit their huts, it was not
until they were told in the Vietnamese language that they exited to
safety. The report suggested that the American soldiers were willing to
kill the Vietnamese civilians, without regard to their political
affiliation. Clearly, the story showed the American’s as “the bad
guys.” While significant at the time, Safer’s story and the few like it
did not constitute a major shift in how the Media’s portrayal of the
American soldier.
33
the form of numbers, each one of them was a man,
most of them quite young, each with hopes he will
never realize, each with family and friends who
will never see him again. Anyway, here are the
numbers. [Hallin, pg. 175]
By humanizing the war in Vietnam, Hallin argues that
the American soldier became flawed by induction. The
soldier’s mission to kill was no longer an admirable
pursuit.
The fourth theme promoted by the media prior to the
Tet Offensive was that “war is rational.” According to
Hallin, the American military was portrayed as moving
inexorably toward victory. [Hallin, pg. 146] By attributing
American action to the pursuit of fixed objectives and
characterizing each battle as a victory or a defeat,
Journalists artificially provided Vietnam the structure of
previous American military campaigns. The media, by taking
the American government’s claims at face value, also gave
the appearance that the war was going well. From 1965 to
1967, the media consistently portrayed the United States as
holding the initiative.8 This theme was supported by
television reports overwhelmingly showing American troops
“on the move.” [Hallin, pg. 146] Hallin also found that 79%
of the media’s assessments of the overall military
situation were positive. The media believed that the war in
Vietnam was going well, and reflected this belief in their
coverage.
8 58% of the reports portrayed Americans as having held the
initiative. The North Vietnamese were described as holding the
initiative 30% of the time, while 12% of the reports described a mutual
advance. The Defense Department would later report that, from 1965 to
1967, the North Vietnamese held the initiative 90% of the time.
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Following Tet, the image of an effective war effort in
Vietnam was supplanted by the image of an irrational and
stagnating conflict. [Hallin, pg. 176] The media began to
focus on the aspects of the war in Vietnam that made it
different than previous campaigns. Vietnam was a war of
attrition, without a front or fixed objectives. Further, it
was nearly impossible to determine whether any given
victory was a victory or a defeat, or how a given battle
contributed to the overall strategic objectives. A typical
post-Tet report, according to Hallin, was: “The Special
Forces and the enemy fought this battle to a standstill.
And there was nothing left but to tend to the wounded, and
fight another day.” [Hallin, pg. 176]
The final pre-Tet theme promoted by the media was the
notion that “winning is what counts.” [Hallin, pg. 144]
According to Hallin, the media did not question the
necessity of American military engagement in Vietnam. Cold
War ideology required American response. Accordingly, the
media sought to purge the war of political and moral
implications. Civilian and military casualties were
relatively inconsequential when compared to the thwarting
of the communist threat. Communism had to be defeated in
South Vietnam.
Following the Tet Offensive, decisive American victory
in Vietnam was no longer the goal of the government. The
Cold War necessity to defend South Vietnam from communism
was replaced by Nixon’s desire to defend “America’s Cold
War credibility.” [Lind, pg. 135] Nixon’s decision to
pursue “peace with honor” had a dramatic effect on the
morale of the troops and subsequently the media coverage.
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[Hallin, pg. 179] To the soldiers fighting in Vietnam, the
war became a lame duck. Yet, the military still tactically
pursued a war of attrition. The “Search and Destroy”
missions, designed to induce large enemy casualties, also
required heavy friendly casualties. While winning the war
in Vietnam was no longer achievable, the soldiers were
expected to sacrifice everything for the cause. The media,
therefore, began to openly challenge the military’s choice
of tactics. [Hallin, pg. 179]
The work presented above is a summary of Hallin’s
finding as presented in The Uncensored War. Admittedly, the
conclusions presented are vague. The shear volume and
diversity of reports make an exhaustive analysis of
consistent themes difficult. However, the message is clear:
media coverage changed dramatically from the beginning of
the American presence in Vietnam to their ultimate
withdrawal.
4. The Impact of Fractured Homefront Morale
The lack of homefront support for the Vietnam War
interfered with the government’s ability to both wage war
and make peace. In terms of the military strategy, the
government was forced to balance the pursuit of aggressive
military tactics with appeasing the public’s distaste for
the war. To both the Johnson and Nixon Administrations,
escalation of American presence in Vietnam was the only way
to decisively win an ultimate victory. [Sobel, pg. 66]
However, both administrations were unwilling to accept the
domestic political ramifications of escalation. Thus, the
public effectively constrained the government’s military
flexibility, specifically its ability to pursue decisive
victory through escalation. The following are two examples,
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one from each Administration, demonstrating the role public
opinion played in American military strategy.
In 1968, General William Westmoreland recommended to
President Johnson that an additional 205,000 to 400,000
troops be sent to Vietnam. Westmoreland’s recommendation
was not in reaction to the Tet Offensive, rather he
believed the additional troops would allow for an expanded
military strategy in the future. [Sobel, pg. 66] While
President Johnson agreed that escalation was militarily
prudent, he worried that the public would not endorse such
a large escalation: “[my] biggest worry was not Vietnam
itself; it was the divisiveness and pessimism at home.”
[Sobel, pg. 67] Ultimately, Johnson decided to send only an
additional 45,000 troops, effectively deescalating the war.
While at the time Johnson would not admit that his decision
to deescalate was due to the fractured public opinion, his
memoirs indicate that public opinion played a large role in
his decision making: “the dissention prolonged the war,
prevented a peaceful settlement on reasonable terms,
encouraged our enemies, disheartened our friends – and
weakened us as a nation.” [Sobel, pg. 67] President Johnson
allowed public opinion to influence, if not drive, his
military strategy.
The effect of fractured public support on military war
is also demonstrated by President Nixon’s ultimatum to the
North Vietnamese in late 1969. Through the operation code
named “Duck Hook,” the Nixon Administration set out to
indirectly inform the North Vietnamese that escalation
would occur on the first of November if they did not grant
“diplomatic concessions.” [Sobel, pg. 82] Unfortunately,
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the ultimatum coincided with the peak of the antiwar
movement, specifically with the moratorium protests. With
the first protest on October 15, 1969, protest planners
intended to hold continually lengthening moratoriums every
month until the Administration promised to deescalate.
[Sobel, pg. 82] While President Nixon believed that
escalation would aid the war effort, he feared the
repercussions of carrying through with his ultimatum:
I knew that unless I had some indisputably good
reason for not carrying out my threat of using
increased force when the ultimatum expired on
November 1, the Communists would become
contemptuous of us and even more difficult to
deal with. I knew, however, that after all the
protests and the Moratorium, American public
opinion would be seriously divided by any
military escalation of the war. [Lind, 137]
When the ultimatum date passed, Nixon did not
escalate. Publicly President Nixon attempted to seem
unaffected by the antiwar movement: “If a President – any
President – allows his course to be set by those who
demonstrate, he would betray the trust of the rest.”
[Sobel, pg. 83] Yet by not carrying through with his
ultimatum, President Nixon clearly allowed public opinion
to drive the nation’s military strategy.
The lack of homefront support for the Vietnam War also
placed limits on the government’s ability to negotiate an
acceptable peace settlement. In order to pursue
pacification, whereby the communists would retreat to the
North in exchange for the halting of American bombing, the
North Vietnamese had to believe that the United States was
committed to win at any cost. However, the peace movement
revealed the fundamental lack of political support for
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escalation, thereby making American threats to escalate
moot. In the fall of 1969, during Operation Duck Hook,
President Nixon noted: “My real concern was that these
highly publicized efforts aimed at forcing me to end the
war were seriously undermining my behind-the-scenes
attempts to do just that.” [Sobel, pg. 82] Nixon feared
that the Vietnamese would call his threat to escalate for
what it was, a bluff. The North Vietnamese recognized that
Nixon did not have the necessary mandate to escalate
American forces in Vietnam, and therefore the anti-war
movement, as Nixon would later state, “undercut the
credibility of the ultimatum.” [Sobel, pg. 83] The
Americans lack of military leverage seriously inhibited
their ability to negotiate an acceptable peace settlement.
Did the lack of public support for the war ultimately
cause the US withdrawal from Vietnam? To solely blame
public opinion for the American retreat is analogous to
blaming a disease on its symptoms. The loss of public
support for the war effort was rooted in the fundamental
deficiencies of the American military and political
strategies. Regardless, the lack of homefront morale did
indirectly play a part in the final decision to retreat by
raising concerns of the American resolve to stick to its
Cold War doctrine of containment.
Fractured public opinion threatened Cold War ideology.
In order to deter Soviet or Chinese aggression, the
American government had to maintain an American consensus
on their willingness to oppose Communism with military
force. [Lind, pg. 257] Without a consensus, the government
feared the Soviets and Chinese would be tempted to spread
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communist ideology in the Asian region, and around the
world. By 1968, the cost of the war in Vietnam, and the
subsequent rise of a significant isolationist movement, had
reduced public support for an open-ended U.S. commitment to
Indochina to dangerously low levels. [Lind, 271] In
addition, the costs were beginning to endanger public
support for other Cold War commitments, such as the defense
of Japan and South Korea. Ultimately, the Nixon
Administration feared that a growing isolationist movement
would force American withdrawal from these key commitments.
The United States had to maintain its Cold War credibility,
and therefore had to withdraw from Vietnam.
The loss of public support did not directly cause the
conclusion of American involvement in Vietnam, but was a
reflection of the government’s failed political and
military policies. As Clark Clifford, the Secretary of
Defense under President Johnson, stated:
I think you cannot force down the throats of
American people a foreign policy they will not
accept… They’ll fail to be present for the draft,
they’ll refuse to raise any money for it, they’ll
refuse in every way to go along with you. And
the President who takes that position, despite
the warning from the American people, is
practically guaranteed to be a failure. He’s
going to fail. [Sobel, pg. 77]
The American public was unwilling to accept the high
cost of winning the Vietnam War. While the specific
military and political strategies used during the conflict
are beyond the scope of this paper, uncovering the lessons
learned from the American governments handling of homefront
morale during the Vietnam conflict is essential to the
topic.
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C. RELEVANT LESSONS LEARNED
1. The New News Media
The attributes of the typical reporter and the
organization he worked for had changed dramatically since
World War II. Reporters, according to Daniel Hallin in The
Uncensored War, no longer saw themselves as “soldiers of
the typewriter” whose mission was to serve the war effort.
Instead, journalism had become “professionalized.” [Hallin,
pg. 7] A journalist was expected to abide by certain
professional ethics, particularly the ethic of political
independence. Resistance to political pressures was
considered a mark of ones journalistic honor. [Hallin, pg.
9] The journalist of the late twentieth century had become
far more independent than his World War II predecessors.
The typical news organization had also changed.
Newspapers of the early 19th century were political
institution, often financially supported by a politician or
a political party. The news organizations, as dramatized in
Orson Wells’ movie Citizen Kane, were routinely part of the
story. [Hallin, pg. 8] However, by the late twentieth
century news organization had become corporate
bureaucracies. These organizations were theoretically free
of outside political pressures.
A new, more adversarial relationship between the media
and the government also began to take form. Officials, in
their effort to control appearance, challenged the autonomy
of the media. Journalists, consequently, were forced to
defend their independence by avoiding anything that could
be construed as partisan. [Hallin, pg. 9] Secondly,
professional journalists, unlike politicians, did not try
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to be part of the story. Instead, journalists began to
reflect the American public’s growing distrust of the
government. Arising out of the Progressive Movement,
American political culture began to hold a general distrust
of the “wielders of power;” the media assumed the role of
political watchdog. [Hallin, pg. 9] The press was becoming
the “forth branch of the government.” By giving up its
right to write with a partisan voice, the press was given
access into to “inner circles” of government. [Hallin, pg.
9] All in all, the rise of professional journalists and
news organizations set the media agenda in direct
opposition to that of the government officials.
The growth of television news added a second dimension
to the government-media relationship. [Hallin, pg. 132]
Though it saw limited use during the Korean War, television
news had matured by 1965. Due to the advent of jets and
satellites, film from the front could be included in daily
news coverage. However, television news coverage would
present a different voice from that of the print media.
Print media was based on the journalist’s ideological
assumptions, and looked to high level sources for
information. For instance, The New York Times early
coverage of the conflict in Vietnam revolved around the
articulation of Cold War doctrine as interpreted by
governmental officials and intellectuals. Television
coverage, on the other hand, revolved around telling the
story of “American boys in action.” [Hallin, pg. 129] By
examining the citizen-soldier’s story, television could
present the war in a very powerful, very familiar voice.
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Television also gave the media a powerful new means of
presenting the news. According to Hallin, television’s
coverage of Vietnam “presented a subconscious level of
ideology, composed of dramatic images of war that could be
‘pulled off the shelf’ to make this confusing conflict more
familiar.” [Hallin, pg. 134] Television also complicated
the traditional tension between the government’s desire to
tell the public what was happening and the media’s desire
to discover what happened. Television gave the media a
stronger voice to refute the government’s statements.
[Hallin, pg. 134] However the power of television can be
ambiguous, distorting facts as easily as revealing them.
[Hallin, pg. 131] Regardless, the rise of television-based
news had a dramatic effect on how the American people
perceived the war in Vietnam.
2. Censorship and the Media in Vietnam
Vietnam was the first war in which reporters were
allowed to accompany military forces yet were not subject
to censorship. The peculiar circumstances of the war made
full censorship legally impossible. Since the United States
had not officially declared war, censorship could not be
legally enforced stateside. American reporters in Vietnam
could therefore circumvent the system by sending reports to
the United States for distribution. [Hallin, pg. 128]
Further, full censorship could not be enforced due to the
lack of legal jurisdiction. Since the US forces were
officially “guests” of the South Vietnamese government, the
U.S. court martial jurisdiction could not be extended to
third country nationals reporting for Asian or European
news organizations. [Hallin, pg. 128]
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Instead of censorship the American government imposed
voluntary guidelines on the press. Reporters had to agree
to a set of rules outlining fifteen categories of
information which they were not allowed to report without
authorization. For example, they were forbidden from
reporting on troop movements or casualty numbers prior to
their announcement in Saigon. Violations could result in
loss of access to the military forces and the government.
[Hallin, pg. 128] The government, as the following
statement by President Kennedy suggests, relied on the
press to govern themselves:
If the press is awaiting a declaration of war
before it imposes the self-discipline of combat
conditions, then I can only say that no war ever
posed a greater threat to our security. If you
are awaiting a finding of ‘clear and present
danger,’ then I can only say that the danger has
never been more clear and its presence more
imminent… every newspaper now asks itself with
respect to every story: ‘Is it news?’ All I
suggest is that you add the question: ‘Is it in
the interest of national security?’ [Hallin, pg.
13]
In the beginning of American involvement in Vietnam,
the news media did show considerable restraint in their
coverage. The press believed, as the government hoped they
would, that the defense of Vietnam was in the national
interests of the United States. [Hallin, pg. 22] To the
American press the larger conflict of “blocking Communist
Expansion” required American presence in Vietnam [Hallin,
pg. 9] However, after the Tet Offensive in 1968, the war in
Vietnam would become the pre-eminent news story. The
coverage of events in Vietnam would soon reflect the
aforementioned changes in the news industry. Was the loose
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censorship of the media within Vietnam a significant factor
in diminishing homefront morale?
President Nixon believed that the lack of censorship
had a strong negative effect on homefront morale. The
following was President Nixon’s reply to the above
question:
The Vietnam War was complicated by factors that
had never before occurred in America’s conduct of
war … The American news media had come to
dominate domestic opinion about its purpose and
conduct… In each night’s TV news and each
mornings paper the war was reported battle by
battle, but little or no sense of the underlying
purpose of the fighting was conveyed. Eventually,
this contributed to the impression that we were
fighting in military and moral quicksand, rather
than toward an important and worthwhile
objective. More than ever before, television
showed the terrible human suffering and sacrifice
of war. Whatever the intention behind such
relentless and literal reporting of war the
result was a serious demoralization of the
homefront, raising the question whether America
would ever again be able to fight an enemy abroad
with unity and strength of purpose at home.
[Hallin, pg. 3]
In summary, Nixon believed that the lack censorship of
the media had a powerful effect on homefront morale by
supplying the American people with the following two forms
information:
• Tactical information without strategic context.
• Information regarding the “terrible human
suffering and sacrifice of war.”
Nixon’s statement is based on the assumptions that the
American people agreed that the war in Vietnam “was a
worthwhile objective,” and that the military was provided
an underlying objective. Historical perspective calls both
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of these notions into question. Consequently, Nixon
overestimated the role that an uncensored media played in
the fracturing of homefront morale.
In terms of maintaining operational security, the
voluntary censorship of the press in Vietnam worked well.
With only a handful of violations, the American government
never considered the press detrimental to military
effectiveness.9 [Hallin, pg. 211] Further, an uncensored
media was not responsible for the shift in American public
opinion following the Tet Offensive in 1968. The
government, by downplaying the strength of the North
Vietnamese and by making overly optimistic claims regarding
the war, set itself up for a fall. [Sobel, pg. 76]
Censorship of the media in Vietnam could not have hidden
the implications of the Tet Offensive.
An uncensored media in Vietnam did show the American
public war from a new perspective. While the print media
relied on “high level sources” for their war coverage,
television coverage focused on telling the story of “the
American soldier at war.” [Hallin, pg. 134] The focus on
the citizen-soldier humanized the war in Vietnam. When this
new perspective was coupled with the coverage of the
“horrors of war,” the human cost of war could no longer be
hidden by cold statistics.10 The uncensored coverage forced
the American public to reconcile the conflict in Vietnam;
they would ultimately decide that the ends did not justify
9 The leak of the U.S. bombing of Cambodia and Laos in 1969 did not
have a dramatic effect on public opinion. They would become larger
political issues following the American withdrawal. [Hallin, pg. 210]
10 Most television coverage was not graphic. 22% of broadcasts showed
actual combat, and 24% showed dead or wounded. The networks, out of
respect for the families of the soldiers, tried to keep these numbers
low. [Hallin, pg. 131]
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the means. The media were not responsible for this
conclusion, but were merely the messenger. If the cause was
worthy of the cost, the American public would have
supported the war in Vietnam.
According to Machiavelli, the control of information
is central to the exercise of political power. In war there
are tactical advantages to both secrecy and deception.
[Hallin, pg. 214] The lack of censorship of the media in
Vietnam did not threaten the American government’s ability
to exercise military secrecy. However, it did limit the
government’s ability to conduct political deception at
home. An unjustified limited campaign, which had become
both overly expensive and stagnating, was disclosed by the
media. However, tighter censorship of the media could not
have prevented the American government from hiding their
flawed military and political strategy in Vietnam. Thus,
while the lack of censorship helped lead the American
public toward dissent, it was but one factor.
3. The Media and Political Consensus
The real power of the media was not demonstrated by
how it presented news emanating from Vietnam, but how it
presented news about Vietnam emanating from the United
States. According to Daniel Hallin, the news media had
become a function of consensus, where the media’s political
position was directly related to the unity of the
government, and the consensus of society at large. “When
political consensus prevailed, journalists tended to act as
responsible members of the political establishment,
upholding the dominant political perspective. However, in
situations of political conflict, the media became more
detached and more adversarial.” [Hallin, pg. 10]
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While not solely reactive, the press began to reflect
disunity in the government and the populace following the
Tet Offensive in 1968. Thus, the transformation of the
Media’s focus and voice was not due to any internal
process, but was a reflection of a faltering political
consensus. While the shift arose out of the liberal anti-
war movement, it only gained legitimacy when the clergy and
government leaders began to hold dissenting viewpoints.
Regardless of whether the dissent constituted a majority,
the modern media gave the “loud minority” a powerful means
of distributing their message. [Hallin, pg. 162] To solely
blame the press for the loss of public support is naïve.
The press acts as a mirror of the state of the political
consensus. [Hallin, pg. 10]
4. American Sensitivity to the Human Cost of War
Another lesson learned concerns the relationship
between homefront morale and the human costs of war.
Homefront morale and the overall war effort were hindered
by the government’s failure to match an appropriate
military strategy to the nation’s willingness to accept
losses in battle. A specific example of the government’s
insensitivity was President Nixon’s “Peace with Honor”
initiative. [Lind, 135]
Nixon, though he was elected to get American forces
out of Vietnam, feared that American Cold War credibility
would be damaged by a hasty withdrawal from the region. The
American public had no desire to see soldiers needlessly
dying in a “lame duck war,” yet Nixon’s prolonged
withdrawal resulted in an additional 21,000 lives lost.
[Lind, pg. 138] Consequently, many “formerly supportive
moderate cold warriors” joined the left in a new
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isolationist majority in congress. [Lind, 138] The American
public, and Congress, would not tolerate such a heavy human
toll.
While easy to question Nixon’s “Peace with Honor”
initiative, it is difficult to argue Nixon had any other
choice. The necessity of a strong U.S. Cold War commitment
was well founded. It is reasonable to assert that a
military strategy based on spending American treasure, such
as a heavier reliance on bombing, in place of blood would
have probably resulted in far less public outcry.
Regardless, any prolonged military campaign has to be
backed by robust public support. The means of pursuing
victory have to match the price the American public is
willing to pay.
5. Loss of Moral Authority
Throughout the War in Vietnam, the government often
failed to maintain the moral high ground in both domestic
and international affairs. For instance, Nixon’s “Peace
with Honor” initiative weakened American cold war ideology.
Michael Lind, in Vietnam: The Necessary War, argues that
the image of a brokering “Nixon dining and drinking and
sailing with the totalitarian rulers of the Soviet empire
and the Chinese dictatorship tended to undermine the claim
that there was a moral difference between the two sides in
the Cold War.” [Lind, pg. 136]
Both President Johnson and President Nixon also
unnecessarily legitimized political dissent. [Lind, pg.
208] President Franklin Roosevelt had set a precedent on
how to deal with campus isolationist movements: “call them
shrimps publicly and privately.” [Lind, pg. 208] Neither
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Johnson nor Nixon would follow his lead. President Johnson,
following his retirement, remarked: “I don’t blame [the
protestors]. They didn’t want to be killed in war, and
that’s easy to understand.” [Lind, pg. 208] President Nixon
would regularly walk to the Washington Monument and
converse with student protestors. [Lind, pg. 208] Instead
of appealing to the general public’s patriotism in
denouncing the anti-war movement, both presidents
legitimized the anti-war cause by actively engaging them in
debate. Greater care should have been shown to maintain the
ideological divide.
Finally, the government’s moral authority suffered in
light of their failure to prosecute genuine acts of
treason. The most famous example of overt treason was Jane
Fonda’s series of anti-war broadcasts over North Vietnamese
Radio from July 14- 22, 1972.11 There was a clear precedent
to prosecute Fonda. In the case Chandler vs. United States
(1948), the Supreme Court declared that any participation
in the radio propaganda of the enemy constituted an “overt
act” of treason. [Lind, pg. 209] A number of American
citizens had been convicted as “radio traitors” during and
after World War II. The typical punishment was a ten
thousand dollar fine and ten to thirty years in prison.
[Lind, pg. 209] Further, the fact that the conflict in
Vietnam was a shooting war, not a legally declared war, was
not a legitimate defense. During the Korean War, also an
undeclared shooting war, the Supreme Court declared that
11 In reaction to the POW’s claim of being tortured in order to
force their participation with her broadcasts, Fonda replied: “I think
many POW’s said they were tortured in order to excuse their
circumstances of capture or their statements and actions opposing the
war.” [Lind, pg. 209]
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the North Koreans could be termed “enemies to the
Constitution.” [Lind, pg. 209]
By carrying out an “overt act” in support of “an
enemy” of the Constitution, Fonda committed treason. By not
prosecuting Fonda, and other similar cases, the government
effectively condoned their acts. According to Lind, “people
assume that if behavior is tolerated by law then it must
not be very bad. If it is legitimate to jail an American
citizen for refusing to answer questions before a grand
jury, it is difficult to understand why the government
should refrain from prosecuting an American citizen who,
during wartime, collaborates with an enemy regime killing
or torturing American soldiers. If the interests of the
American republic are worth defending from enemies without,
they are worth defending from enemies within.” [Lind, pg.
209] The failure to defend their cause from internal
enemies ultimately weakened both the government’s moral
authority and the American cause in Vietnam.
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The WWII and Vietnam case studies both provide
valuable insight into the development and protection of
homefront morale. While clearly differences exist between
the case studies and the War on Terrorism, the overlapping
campaign attributes allow for the development of a set of
recommendations for the U.S. governments current homefront
morale effort. These recommendations will be offered as
answers to the following four questions:
A. WHO SHOULD DISSEMINATE WAR INFORMATION?
The War on Terrorism, like all military campaigns,
will force the American government to balance the need for
operational security with the publics demand for war
information. However, campaign attributes unique to the War
on Terrorism will limit the government’s flexibility. As
previously discussed, the war will not be defined by large
force on force engagements, but will be fought through
intelligence gathering and precise prosecution of the
enemy. Consequently, the government’s ability to protect
its intelligence gathering methods and sources will be of
paramount importance, requiring the War on Terrorism to be
fought primarily in secret. While in the short term the
government can maintain a high degree of secrecy, the
protracted nature of the campaign could pressure the
government for more robust disclosure of war information.
In order to adequately maintain this delicate balance, the
government should create an independent organization, much
like the Ministry of Information, to act as the primary
liaison between the war effort and the public. The creation
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of such an agency would significantly empower a homefront
morale campaign.
As seen in the British case study, an independent
information agency would be more capable of meeting both
the governments need for operational security and the
public’s need for war information. The ability to meet both
demands is contingent on the given agencies access to
available war information. The Ministry of Information’s
effectiveness, in light of their limited access, suffered
because they were denied informational top sight. Thus,
full and complete access to war information should be
granted to the homefront morale campaign. Doing so would
not only allow for war information to be placed within its
appropriate context, but would also help determine what
information is safe for disclosure.
The British case study also demonstrates the need for
a homefront morale campaigns utilization of information
regarding their audience’s intelligence, biases, and needs.
By regularly reevaluating their conception of the audience,
a homefront morale campaign can identify potential avenues
of approach, and better tailor communications. A
centralized homefront morale campaign would be the logical
instrument to both research this information and to
leverage it toward more effective communication between the
government and the public.
B. HOW SHOULD HOMEFRONT MORALE BE GAUGED?
As demonstrated by the British case study, a homefront
morale campaign would benefit from the development of a
clear and universally accepted concept of homefront morale
and what constitutes indications of lowered morale. The
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Ministry of Information’s assessment of homefront morale
was often clouded by anecdotal evidence; frequently
resulting in poorly designed homefront propaganda. Further,
the Ministry of Information, by striving for constant
levels of public opinion, failed to recognize the dynamic
nature of homefront morale. Thus, a homefront morale
campaign should anticipate a cyclical nature of public
support. By recognizing the dynamic nature of morale, the
campaign can better match their morale building efforts
with both the situation and the needs of the audience. The
War on Terrorism’s homefront morale strategy, based on the
lessons learned from the British case study, should include
a clear definition of homefront morale and understand the
cyclical nature of homefront morale.
C. WHAT ROLE SHOULD THE MEDIA PLAY?
The media will have a powerful effect on the level of
homefront support for the War on Terrorism. The Vietnam
case study demonstrates the need for the American homefront
morale campaign to develop a comprehensive strategy for
dealing with the media.
As discussed in the Vietnam case study, the news media
of the late twentieth century and early twenty first
century has become the “forth branch of government.”
[Hallin, pg. 9] Government officials, in their effort to
control appearance, seek to challenge the autonomy of the
media. Consequently, journalists are forced to defend their
independence by avoiding anything that could be construed
as partisan. The opposing agenda of the media has had a
dramatic effect on news coverage, particularly war
coverage. During Vietnam, both the Johnson and Nixon
administrations failure to recognize this fundamental
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change contributed to their inability to control homefront
morale. Thus, the applicable lesson is a comment on the
dynamic nature of the news media, where the information
strategy of a homefront morale campaign has to be adjusted
in order to meet the changing relationship between the
government and the media.
Secondly, the Vietnam case study highlights the effect
loose censorship of the media has on homefront morale.
While it did not jeopardize the American government’s
ability to maintain operational security, the limited
censorship did have a dramatic psychological effect on the
American public. An uncensored media showed the American
public war from a new perspective. While the print media
relied on “high level sources” for their war coverage,
television coverage focused on telling the story of “the
American soldier at war.” [Hallin, pg. 134] The focus on
the citizen-soldier humanized the war in Vietnam. When this
new perspective was coupled with the coverage of the
“horrors of war,” the human cost of war could no longer be
hidden by cold statistics. [Hallin, pg. 134] Like Vietnam,
the limited nature of the War on Terrorism makes full
censorship of the media impractical. However, the campaign
for homefront morale would be served by adjusting its
information strategy to the consequences of loose
censorship.
Finally, the homefront morale campaign should
acknowledge the relationship between the media and the
state of political consensus. As discussed in the Vietnam
case study, the news media has become a function of
consensus, where the media’s political position is directly
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related to the unity of the government, and the consensus
of society at large. [Hallin, pg. 135] In Vietnam, the
breakdown of the consensus throughout the political
spectrum pushed the media toward taking an adversarial
stand on the war. The development of homefront support for
the War on Terrorism would be served by adopting an
information strategy which limited the portrayal of
disunity within the government and public. The campaign for
homefront morale should stress the consensus throughout all
levels of government and society.
D. WHAT FUNDAMENTAL THEMES SHOULD BE PROMOTED?
The War on Terrorism’s homefront morale campaign’s
information strategy ought to include a set of fundamental
themes the government should stress in order to develop and
maintain public support for the war effort. Maurice
Tugwell’s Mobilizing Trinity offers a solid framework to
develop these themes. Tugwell believes that a military
campaign can only exist if the warring nation meets the
following three psychological criteria:
First, a belief in something good to be promoted
or defended;
Second, a belief in something evil to be
destroyed or resisted;
Third, a belief in the ultimate victory of the
good cause. [Tugwell, pg. 70]
While it cannot do so alone, a homefront morale
campaign can aid in meeting these criteria by serving as
the intermediary between the public and the cause. Thus,
the campaign for homefront support of the War on Terrorism
should aim to help form the public’s perception of what is
at stake, who the enemy is, and the prospect of victory.
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Both case studies offer insight in to how the United States
should go about meeting these criteria.
To meet the first criterion, the homefront morale
campaign must emphasize the notion that the United States
is fighting for a worthy cause. While the Vietnam case
study clearly demonstrates the public’s unwillingness to
support an irrational campaign, the British case study
demonstrates the need for basing a war effort on the
defense of shared national principles. The War on
Terrorism, like the British campaign during World War II,
represents a direct challenge to the American way of life.
Thus, the War on Terrorism should be similarly founded on
broad and inspiring principles, such as the defense of
freedom.
To meet the second criterion, the morale building
campaign should portray the enemy as evil. Maintaining the
publics association of the enemy with evil is essential to
“mobilize the necessary power of right for ones own cause,”
and therefore of vital importance to a homefront morale
campaign. [Speier, pg. 137] Both case studies offer insight
into how to meet the second criterion. The World War II
case study demonstrates the need for a morale building
campaign to implement a systematic means of portraying the
enemy’s evil nature. While the British clearly wanted the
public to believe the Germans were fundamentally evil, the
Ministry of Information rationed the public’s exposure to
enemy atrocities. This systematic approach offered the
British the ability to combat audience apathy towards the
enemy and provided the British flexibility in confronting
enemy propaganda. The campaign to develop homefront morale
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for the War on Terrorism would benefit from adopting a
similar strategy.
Along with the need to portray the enemy as evil, the
United States must also maintain the War on Terrorism’s
moral authority. As demonstrated in the Vietnam case study,
homefront support for a war effort is directly linked the
warring nation’s moral authority. In Vietnam, The
governments failure to maintain the ideological divide
between the United States and its enemies, combined with
the governments legitimization of homefront dissent,
damaged homefront morale. Public support for the War on
Terrorism could be similarly damaged by a loss of moral
authority. Thus, the United States cannot afford to either
legitimize the terrorist’s cause or appear guilty of
committing acts similar to terrorism. The United States’
ability to maintain the moral authority is integral to the
development and maintenance of homefront support for the
War on Terrorism.
To meet the third criterion, the campaign for
homefront morale should stress the eventuality of ultimate
victory. The unique campaign attributes of the War on
Terrorism clearly make the achievement of this criterion
difficult. The War on Terrorism, unlike the two case
studies, will not be marked by conflict between nation
states; rather will be against loosely connected non-
governmental organizations. While this difference is
substantial, the Vietnam case study offers some insight
into the necessity of meeting this informational objective.
Prior to the Tet Offensive, the American government
presented the American public with an over optimistic
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assessment of the War in Vietnam. The implications of Tet,
and their stark contrast to the government’s reports,
allowed the enemy to leverage a tactical loss into a
strategic victory. Thus, the lesson learned is that the
government’s public assessments of the War on Terrorism
must be based on the truth. In order to prevent a political
backlash similar to Tet, the war coverage should show
Americans forces winning and losing. This notion is also
supported by the British case study. The Ministry of
Information utilized the release of bad news to leverage
stronger homefront morale. By releasing bad news, the
credibility of the government was inherently strengthened.
Further, the British used bad news as a means to combat
complacency and to also emphasize their own successes. The
War on Terrorism will clearly be challenged to portray the
inevitability of an ultimate American victory. Regardless,
the homefront morale effort would be served by heading the
lessons learned from both case studies.
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